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The aim of this paper is to examine whether there is a co-insurance mechanism against 
provincial aggregate income fluctuations between the Chinese provinces. Our theoretical 
argument relies on the existence of an efficient allocation of risk between the Chinese 
provinces. According to this analysis, an institutional arrangement between the provinces 
allows the perfect smoothing of provincial private consumption. In this case, changes in 
provincial private consumption depend rather on changes in aggregate Chinese income than 
on asymmetric changes in provincial income. We test this hypothesis on the 1989-2000 period 
for 30 Chinese provinces using the GMM estimator. Econometric evidence highlights the 
weakness of co-insurance mechanisms between the Chinese provinces. First, we reject the 
hypothesis of perfect insurance. Second, there does not seem to exist a significant, though 
imperfect, insurance mechanism. Indeed, the provinces’ private consumption reactions are 
the same either after a shock affecting all the provinces or after an asymmetric shock.  
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Résumé : 
L’objectif de cet article est de tester l’existence d’un mécanisme de co-assurance budgétaire 
entre les provinces chinoises. Un modèle de fédéralisme budgétaire est construit, dans lequel 
un planificateur bienveillant maximise le bien-être de ménages provinciaux ayant de 
l’aversion au risque. Dans l’hypothèse d’une co-assurance parfaite, les variations de la 
consommation des ménages ne sont pas affectées par les chocs propres à chaque ménage 
provincial. Le modèle est testé sur des données de consommation et de revenu des provinces 
chinoises, organisées en panel. L’estimateur retenu est celui des moments généralisés. D’une 
part, l’hypothèse de co-assurance parfaite est rejetée. D’autre part, les propensions 
marginales à consommer les chocs propres à chaque province et les chocs communs ne sont 
pas différentes. On en déduit donc l’inexistence d’un mécanisme de co-assurance budgétaire. 
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1 -   Introduction 
China’s fiscal system is highly decentralised due to History and to the size of the 
country (Dulbecco & Renard, 2002). Today, sub-National governments represent more than 
70% of total budgetary expenditures. Local and particularly provincial governments have thus 
a true autonomy in their economic action despite a strong political centralisation. Many 
observers consider that China’s economy operates much like a federal system (World Bank, 
2002). 
Central-province fiscal relationships have moved through three stages ( e.g  Knight & 
Li, 1999). Before 1978, the provincial governments collected revenues and handed them over 
to the Central Government, in accordance with the Plan. At that time, there did not exist 
provincial objective functions: provincial governments acted as agents of the Central 
Government.  
The transition to a market economy has begun in the second stage (1978-1994). This 
stage was mainly characterised by a strong decentralisation in tax collection and in 
expenditure assignments. For instance, the share of the tax and non tax income collected by 
the Central Government felt sharply from 40.5% in 1984 to 22% in 1993 (Annual Statistical 
Yearbook, 2001). Local governments acquired enough autonomy to pursue their objectives 
through the so-called “revenue-contracting system”. However, these fiscal contracts were 
very different between the provinces so that the system was neither efficient nor equitable, 
notably in the case of provincial asymmetric shocks.  
The reform of 1994 implemented re-centralisation of revenues. Revenue assignments 
have been structured according to the  “Tax Sharing System”. The latter raises the share of 
local expenditures financed by central transfers while leaving provincial expenditures 
responsibilities unchanged. During this period, the revenues accruing to the Central 
Government have risen from 49% to 56% of total revenues. Local governments are allowed to 
collect only the taxes defined as being local. This institutional evolution has increased 
capacity of the Central Government to conduct its own policy. The question is whether this 
reform favours t he inter-provincial stabilisation of revenues in a similar way as an inter-
provincial co-insurance mechanism. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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 This paper tests the existence of a mutual insurance between provinces in China. The 
rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the second section, we first expose the arguments 
according to which inter-provincial grants can be interpreted as a risk sharing contracts that 
provide insurance against provincial income fluctuations. Second, we develop a model of 
fiscal federalism where a benevolent  planner maximises the welfare of risk adverse 
representative provincial households. In the third section, the model is tested with time series 
provincial data on consumption and income. This panel dimension allows distinguishing 
between idiosyncratic shocks (insurable) and co-variant ones (uninsurable). 
2 -   Protection against income fluctuations in China. 
The Chinese reforms are intended to promote market mechanisms. In a market 
economy, the households should be able to shield their own consumption from income 
fluctuations. Insurance markets theoretically provide income insurance or households can 
engage in risk coping activities. Market failures as well as enforcement problems or 
restrictions to inner migrations may however justify a public intervention. The latter can be 
achieved by inter-provincial stabilisation corresponding to the traditional aims of fiscal 
federalism.  
a -   Private insurance and fiscal federalism against income fluctuations. 
Risk adverse households and especially the poorest do not accept that t heir 
consumption fluctuates along with their income. Under insurance and credit markets failures, 
households cope with risk in various ways. Avoiding consumption fluctuations despite 
income variability
2 can be achieved when the household smoothes its own consumption either 
relying to saving or to sharing risk. In the former, it is an autarkic solution, in the latter it is an 
inter-individual insurance strategy.  
                                                                 
2 We only consider risk-coping behaviours where the objective is to mitigate consumption fluctuations i.e. to 
secure consumption under the hypothesis of exogenous incomes. We do not address strategies that bring a 
reduction in income risk that can be achieved through income diversification. The latter strategies are commonly 
labelled risk coping (Alderman & Paxson, 1992). Migration can be seen as a risk management option in the 
sense that households try to mitigate their income risk. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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Consumption smoothing and life cycle accumulation traditionally motivate saving. In 
a risky environment, there is however an additional motive related to specific  i.e. 
precautionary saving intended to compensate for the realisation of unexpected income 
fluctuations. In this context, prudent households accumulate assets considered as a 
precautionary b uffer stock ( e.g. Kimball 1990, Deaton 1992,  Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993). 
The latter is depleted after the occurrence of a negative income shock. Several problems arise 
however with this strategy. Holding unproductive liquid assets can impede productive 
investments.
3 Moreover, several analyses suggest that the availability of buffer stock does not 
guarantee a smooth consumption pattern
4. For instance, households that run out of buffer 
stock may become more vulnerable to repeated future negative shocks. When  productive 
assets ( e.g. livestock) constitute buffer stocks, household may prefer to reduce consumption 
rather than deplete their buffer. When there is a too large amount of buffer stock for sale, 
assets prices may collapse that is detrimental to the achievement of insurance objectives. 
More generally, this autarkic strategy is welfare costly and especially for the poorest.    
Households may share the risk within a community that can be villages, families, 
ethnic groups as well as  ad hoc solidarity networks (Cochrane, 1991, Mace, 1991, Udry, 
1994, Townsend, 1995, Grimard, 1997, Ogaki et Zhang, 2001  etc.). The risk-sharing group 
allows theoretically a perfect allocation of resources within the group  i.e. perfect insurance. 
The evidence suggests however only w hat is usually labelled as partial insurance. For 
example, Jalan and Ravallion (1999) reject the full insurance hypothesis for a panel of 
households in rural China and find evidence of partial insurance. This result may be explained 
by enforcement and information problems that make opportunistic behaviours more 
profitable. In one case,  ex ante moral hazard may appear when households are incited to 
engage in risky activities they would not take in without insurance. In another case, the 
unobservable character of income losses within the group may cause ex post moral hazard. 
Neither inter-individual nor inter-temporal consumption smoothing do effectively 
protect against consumption fluctuations. Hence, this failure can advocate for fiscal co-
insurance between  the Chinese provinces in order to smooth provincial asymmetric 
disturbances. In this case the central government budget acts like an asymmetric shock  i.e. 
                                                                 
3 Jalan and Ravallion (2001) study the consequences of eliminating income risk on the share of household wealth 
held in unproductive liquid assets in rural China.  
4 See for example Hoogeveen (2001) for a recent survey of household strategies against income risk. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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provincial specific shock absorber. This function can be considered as a prescription of the 
traditional theory of fiscal federalism stemming from the literature on the positive theory of 
public finance ( e.g. Musgrave, 1959): central governments have the responsibility for 
provincial macroeconomic stabilisation (Oates, 1999). Two channels can be activated: a 
passive one and an active one. First, automatic fiscal stabilisers can be considered as passive 
channels of inter-provincial risk sharing. In other words, an asymmetric conjuncture induces 
mechanic transfers between provinces (Cohen & Follette, 2000).   Second, the central 
government can actively subsidise provinces to compensate for the crisis effects
5 and can use 
inter-provincial grants,  i.e. transfers from the central to the regional governments as risk 
sharing contracts
6. 
Consumption smoothing could  be achieved with contra-cyclical provincial fiscal 
deficits. In other words, inter-temporal consumption smoothing in each province can act as a 
substitute for inter-provincial consumption smoothing. Nevertheless, since 1994 the Chinese 
budgetary rules limit the extent to provincial fiscal deficits. Consequently, probable wage 
rigidities and limited inter-provincial labour mobility give a choice between only two 
solutions: a strong degree of provincial fiscal autonomy or an increase in the desirable level of 
central redistribution (Mundell, 1961, Kenen 1969).  
b -   Analytical framework: a model of co-insurance between the Chinese provinces. 
We interpret co-insurance between the Chinese provinces as a risk sharing mechanism 
that could be achieved  through either institutional or informal arrangements between the 
provinces. We do not identify one particular arrangement, either private ( e.g. inner migrant 
remittances) or public (inter-provincial grants), we only focus on the consequences of risk 
sharing on provincial household consumption. 
                                                                 
5 This short-term stabilisation function of the fiscal policy should not be confused with the long-term 
redistribution function that tries to reduce the consumption differentials between provinces.    
6 Recent contributions in the field of fiscal federalism specifically address this issue of risk sharing in a federal 
structure. Lockwood (1999) interprets intergovernmental grants as risk sharing contracts  i.e. ‘interregional 
insurance’.  Bucovetsky (1998) shows that risk sharing arrangements in a federal structure provide insurance and 
make federal structures preferable. Lee (1998) examines interactions between assistance to the poor and risk 
sharing. Flodén (2001) shows that government debt and redistributive taxation help people to  smooth 
consumption in the presence of uninsurable individual specific risk. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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We examine the behaviour of a representative household for the i
th province, i = 1, …, 
N ; s indexes the S states of nature occurring with a probability
7 p(s). There are T periods, t = 
1, …,  T.  Let  ci,s,t design the household consumption in private goods and  yi,s,t be its 
exogenous income.  Ui is the inter-temporal utility function that is additively separable over 
time and states of nature.  ui is the instantaneous utility index that is increasing and concave; 
its also separable with respect to consumption and leisure: 
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Assume that an efficient allocation of risk between the Chinese provinces is described 
by the weighted sum of utilities of each of the provinces’ representative households. li is the 
weight of the i
th  household ;  0 < li < 1 and Si li = 1. Assume also that the households have 
the same time discount rate r > 0 and the same beliefs with respect to the states of nature. The 
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The corresponding Lagrangian function and multiplier µ a ssociated with the resource 
constraint are
8 : 
( ) ( ) ￿ ￿
= =





t s i t s i i i t s i c y µ U µ c
1 1
, , , , , , , l              (3) 
The first order necessary condition (FOC) for an interior solution
9 for household i is: 
                                                                 
7 We assume also that the probabilities of the states of nature are independent i.e. income shocks are independent 
and identically distributed over time.  
8 The multiplier µ that is interpreted as the marginal utility of income in China is also assumed constant over 
time. 
9 The optimal consumption is strictly positive with an infinite marginal utility of consumption when consumption 
is zero. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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This equality holds across all  N provinces and means that the consumption of 
household  i is a non-linear function of the consumption of household  j at any point of time 
and states of nature. This implies that the income of household  i does not influence its 
consumption. It rather depends on the average consumption, that is the Chinese aggregate 
consumption.  
To see this theoretical result in a more direct way, we assume that the households have 
the same instantaneous utility function. More precisely we assume that they have a Constant 
Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility index where s measures the risk aversion (s > 0): 




                    (6) 
The FOC then becomes: 
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So the provinces’ household consumption is equal to the average level of consumption 
in China plus a time-invariant province fixed effect that reflects the relative weight of one 
province with respect to another one. This equation means that an efficient allocation of 
income risk between the Chinese provinces implies that the change in one province 
consumption is equal to the change in the China average consumption. In other words, the 
households are p erfectly insured against idiosyncratic risks  i.e. provincial specific income 
risks. 
This result holds when we assume that the households face risks concerning their 
marginal utility indices  i.e. preference shocks. In this case the utility function of the provinces 
becomes 
10: 
( ) ( ) t i t i c
t i t i e c u , , 1
, , ,
q - ￿ s - ￿
s
- = q                 (10) 
where  qi,t is a time-varying additive unobserved shock that affects preferences. 
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Under the latter a ssumption, the change in one province consumption, net of 
preference shocks, are equalised across provinces: they may differ from the China average 
one because of a remaining random shock affecting their preferences. The main implications 
of the efficient allocation of risks between the provinces are thus the following: 
-  A province’s consumption is unaffected by asymmetric or idiosyncratic income 
shocks which should not affect the other provinces;  
-  A province’s consumption is solely affected by symmetric or  co-variant income 
shocks affecting all the provinces.  
                                                                 
10 In the presence of several additive income risks, the theoretical results are unchanged. See for example Mace 
(1991) (cited in Alderman & Paxson, 1992) or Jalan & Ravallion (1999) for a theoretical exposition of these 
extensions. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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3 -   Econometric evidence of co-insurance with time series provincial data. 
The econometric analysis covers the 1990-2000 period for 30 Chinese provinces
11. We 
use official statistics on private consumption  and GDP. Data are expressed per capita and 
deflated by the provinces’ consumer price indices (base 100 in 1992).   
a -   Does there exist a perfect co- insurance mechanism between the Chinese provinces? 
The panel data set consists of the N Chinese provinces denoted by i = 1 to N ; N = 30 
observed at each of the 11 periods, t = 1990 to 2000. We estimate a regression of the form: 
￿ e D + ￿ k + D ￿ b = D
t
t i t t t i t i A Y C , , ,                 (12) 
D is the difference operator between  t and  t-1. The dependent variable  DCi,t is the 
change in the province i consumption. DYi,t  represents the change in the province i GDP. At is 
a dummy that is set to 1 over the period t and t-1 and 0 otherwise. ￿kt.At controls for shocks 
affecting the China average consumption,  so  DYi,t is a measure of idiosyncratic shocks on the 
province i. Dei,t is the usual disturbance term.  
The null hypothesis corresponding to perfect insurance between the provinces implies 
that the estimated  b, interpreted as the marginal propensity to consume idiosyncratic shocks, 
is equal to zero. Moreover k must be significantly different from zero.   
We choose the above specification for two main purposes. First, specific effects 
disappear when taking first differences in consumption and income
12. Second, first 
differences are stationary. I ncome shocks are thus transitory and do not induce adjustments in 
                                                                 
11 We use the term ‘province’ as well for the provinces as for autonomous regions and municipalities, for the 
sake of simplicity. The ‘provinces’ included in the sample are: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, 
Shanghai,  Liaoning,  Jilin,  Heilongjiang,  Jiangsu,  Zhejiang,  Anhui,  Fujian,  Jiangxi,  Shandong,  Henan,  Hunan, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xingjiang, Hubei, 
Tibet. The municipality of Chongqing, that became autonomous at the end of the period under study, is included 
in the province of Sichuan.  
12 An F-test  at the 1% level rejects the significance of fixed effects for the provinces.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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consumption flows. The Im, Pesaran and Shin test (1997) for heterogeneous panels rejects at 
the 1% level a collective unit root in provincial GDP and private consumption changes
13.  
Changes i n provincial GDP and private consumption cannot be considered as 
orthogonal to the error term for various reasons. First, changes in provincial GDP are 
measured with error. Second, there exists a simultaneity bias between changes in private 
consumption and GDP because of the definition of GDP in the national accounts. Finally, 
unobservable idiosyncratic shocks can be correlated with changes in provincial GDP. We 
assume however that the error term is orthogonal to lagged changes in provincial GDP so that 
the latter can be used as instruments
14.   
Equation (12) is estimated by the Generalised Method of Moments (Hansen, 1982) 
that does not require explicit pieces of information about the shape of the disturbance 
distribution. Moreover it is robust to heteroskedastic disturbances
15. The estimation is 
conducted in two ways.  
In the first way, equation (12) is estimated on different periods that implies a change in 
the size of the panel and thus in the instruments. More precisely, on the 1991-2000 period, the 
maximum lag length in the instrument list is one; until the 1999-2000 period where the 
maximum lag length is nine. For each period we test the opportunity of instrumentation with 
the Hausman exogeneity test (Nakamura and Nakamura, 1981). Moreover we test the 
instruments’ validity with the over-identification  J statistic (Newey and West, 1987)
16. Finally 
we check the significance of the temporal dummies  St  kt.At with a  F test. The results are 
presented in Table 1. 
                                                                 
13 The Im, Pesaran and Shin test consists in calculating a t statistic averaged across the provinces. Formally, the 
equation is of the form x - x(-1) = a + b.x(-1) where x stands for changes in GDP or for changes in consumption. 
An equation is estimated for each province. The statistic associated with the collective root is calculated as the 
average value of the t statistic associated with b. The average calculated t are respectively –2,160 for the changes 
in GDP and –2,471 for the changes in consumption.  
14 This is equivalent as considering that measurement errors are not correlated through time.  
15 The hypothesis of absence of auto-correlation cannot be rejected at the 1% level. It is thus useless to use an 
estimator that is robust to auto-correlation. When we however use it, the results are not modified.  
16  Under the null hypothesis of over-identification, the J statistic multiplied by the number of restrictions is 
distributed like a Khi-square where the degrees of freedom are given by the difference between the number of 
parameters and the number of instruments. We also verify the explanatory power of the maximum lagged 
instrument in the auxiliary equation. CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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Table 1. The perfect co-insurance test on different periods.  
 




















1991-2000  0.313  9.496 ***  -1.848  *   -  0.586  3.227 ***   300 
1992-2000  0.324  9.954 ***  -2.557  **   1.168  (1)   0.649  3.596 ***   270 
1993-2000  0.326  10.251  ***   -2.827  ***   0.997  (2)    0.619  3.648 ***   240 
1994-2000  0.299  11.752  ***   -3.081  ***   5.574  (3)    0.661  3.994 ***   210 
1995-2000  0.292  11.578  ***   -3.058  ***   4.423  (4)    0.647  3.824 ***   180 
1996-2000  0.286  11.421  ***   -2.926 ***   4.911  (5)    0.626  3.742 ***   150 
1997-2000  0.285  12.469  ***   -2.113 **   5.750  (6)    0.621  3.313 **   120 
1998-2000  0.261  10.748  ***   -0.296  3.598  (7)    0.560  4.906 ***   90 
1999-2000  0.218  4.551  ***   1.032  4.831  (8)    0.328  1.856  60 
Significance levels: *** :1%, ** : 5%, * : 10%. 
Note that the Hausman test is not significant on the 1998-2000 and on the 1999-2000 
periods that questions the interpretation of the corresponding equation
17. On the other periods, 
we reject the hypothesis of a perfect co-insurance mechanism. The b coefficient interpreted as 
the marginal propensity to consume idiosyncratic shocks is approximately 0.3 on the 1991-
2000 to 1997-2000 periods. Our results do not deliver a temporal heterogeneity of the  b 
coefficients. 
In the second way, we test the sensitivity of our results to the instrument set by 
estimating a system of 11 simultaneous equations with the GMM estimator. Each equation 
corresponds to one particular period. The number of observations in each equation equals the 
number of the Chinese provinces. The maximum lag length in the instruments is 4. We 
impose that the  b coefficient is the same between each equation, which is consistent w ith our 
previous results. The results are given in table 2 and do not contradict the previous ones.  
                                                                 
17 When we estimate the last 2 equations with OLS and a White correction the estimated b are respectively 0,274 
(t = 9,511***) and 0,295 (t = 5,462***). Moreover, on the last period, the dummies are not significant.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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Table 2. The perfect co-insurance test with simultaneous equations.  











1990-2000  0.290  200.270 ***  29.469 (24)  30 
Significance level : *** : 1%. 
Whatever the way we estimate equation (12), we reject the proposition according to 
which there exists a perfect insurance mechanism against income fluctuations between the 
Chinese provinces. This result is however not surprising. It is consistent with existing 
empirical literature. Indeed microeconometric analyses of co-insurance ( e.g. Jalan and 
Ravallion, 1999 on rural China) as well macroeconometric analyses that quantify the amount 
of risk sharing, reject the perfect co-insurance proposition (Asdrubali  et al. 1996, 
Athanasoulis & Van Wincoop, 2001 on states in the United States). It is also consistent with 
recent works on China stressing either the worsening of the distribution of fiscal resources 
across provinces through time or the symbolic significance of equalisation grants from central 
to local governments.
18 
To the extent that perfect co-insurance is empirically rejected, we now turn to a 
weaker proposition.  
b -   Does there exist an imperfect co-insurance mechanism between the Chinese 
provinces? 
Empirical evidence on insurance mechanisms suggests that  b is significantly different 
from zero, thus rejecting the complete insurance i.e. the complete risk-sharing hypothesis. If  b 
were found to be equal to one, we should suppose that there is no insurance at all. The 
intermediate case where b is strictly less than 1, that is not predicted by the theoretical model, 
is usually interpreted as partial co-insurance. However, we can question this interpretation by 
investigating the reaction of provincial consumption to asymmetric as well as symmetric 
shocks
19.  
                                                                 
18 See World Bank (2002) for a extensive description of fiscal decentralisation and expenditure assignments in 
China.  
19  Morduch (1995) on micro-economic data explains that measurement errors that are correlated through time 
may cause the rejection of the perfect insurance hypothesis.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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We thus propose to estimate the following equation (13) that is the same as equation 
(12) without the temporal dummies
20. Dwi, t is the disturbance term: 
   t i t i t i Y C , , , w D + D ￿ f = D                   (13) 
The results
21 are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. The imperfect co-insurance test.  










1991-2000  0.313  8.799 ***  -1.705 *  -  0.558 
1992-2000  0.323  8.571 ***  -2.445 **  1.711  0.585 
1993-2000  0.330  9.158 ***  -2.813 ***  1.842  0. 588 
1994-2000  0.297  10.820 ***  -2.995 ***  5.523  0.618 
1995-2000  0.279  10.874 ***  -2.859 ***  7.095  0.619 
1996-2000  0.286  10.586 ***  -2.994 ***  9.856 *  0.626 
1997-2000  0.259  12.608 ***  -1.969 **  6.915  0.597 
1998-2000  0.232  9.337 ***  -0.346  3.856  0.519 
1999-2000  0.212  4.093 ***  0.647  4.524  0.319 
Significance levels: *** : 1%, ** : 5%, * : 10% 
We find that the estimated b and f do not differ significantly. There does not seem to 
exist a difference between on the one hand the marginal propensity to consume out 
idiosyncratic shocks ( b) and on the other hand the marginal propensity to c onsume out all 
shocks ( f). Asymmetric shocks alone seem to have the same impact on consumption as both 
asymmetric and symmetric shocks. We interpret this result as the rejection of partial co-
insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. Indeed, the latter proposition would imply a difference 
between the estimated f and b. 
The estimation of a simultaneous equations system using the same method as 
previously does not invalidate this result
22.  
                                                                 
20 In other words, this is equivalent as testing the existence of a random walk in consumption: the instrumented 
DYi, t  can be interpreted as the expected change in GDP (Hall, 1978, Deaton, 1992). Under the permanent income 
and rational expectation hypotheses, the predicted value of the f coefficient is zero: changes in consumption are 
solely caused by unexpected changes in income. 
21 The Hausman exogeneity test is negative for the last two periods. Equation (13) is thus estimated wwith OLS 
and a White correction. The corresponding f are respectively 0,272 ( t = 8,854***) and 0,308(t = 5,872***). 
Notice that the result on the 1996-2000 period is questionable, as the over-identification test is significant at the 
10% level.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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Table 4. The imperfect co-insurance test with a system of simultaneous equations. 




Over-identification J test 
(number of restrictions) 
1990-2000  0.295  660.441 ***  24.142 (24) 
Significance levels: *** : 1%. 
 
 
4 -   Conclusion 
There now exist several studies on the decentralisation of r evenue and spending 
decisions ( e.g. Oates, 1999 for a review). They mainly focus on the evidence between 
decentralisation and economic performance. For instance, Zhang and Zou (2001) find a robust 
negative relationship in China. Our results shed an another light on the detrimental 
consequences of current fiscal institutions of China. Indeed, our econometric results suggest 
that consumption stabilisation mechanisms between provinces do not exist in China: public 
inter-provincial transfers do not compensate for private insurance market failures.    
The prevalence of uninsured provincial income risk has negative effects on efficiency 
and equity. On the one hand, if income fluctuations cannot be mitigated, provinces household 
decisions cannot be based on profit  maximising alone. They cannot completely exploit their 
comparative advantages. They must engage in costly risk-management activities. Household 
may preferably hold unproductive assets that are however imperfect insurance substitutes. At 
the moment, the Chinese Central Government seems to address this issue in three ways. First 
it allows for the relaxation of the provincial budgetary constraints through extra-budgetary 
spending or more exceptionally through provincial public borrowing.
23 Second the Central 
Government relaxes the legal obstacles to labour mobility between the provinces. Third, it 
promotes a degree of wage flexibility that is a substitute to migration.
24 On the other hand, 
uninsured provincial income risk can widen the welfare gap between the provinces insofar as 
risk is costlier for the poorest. Their resource constraint is binds, so that they can not afford 
for self-insurance mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 We can wonder whether provinces have a different reaction to shocks. This question is addressed with the test 
of the spatial stability of the estimated propensities. We thus estimate equation (12) and (13) with a 
multiplicative spatial dummy taking the value of the change in GDP for coastal provinces and 0 otherwise. The 
corresponding coefficient is never significant.  
23 Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that capital market smoothing is the main absorber of states’ product shocks in the 
US between 1964 and 1990.  CERDI, Etudes et Documents, Ec 2002.17 
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